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courts is still adverse to this decision. 21 A party is not precluded from.raising
the diversity issue, either in the pleadings or otherwise, by any form of
laches, waiver or estoppel. 22 The minority position is well taken that there
should be some point at which undisputed jurisdictional facts will be settled.
However, when a party reasonably "suggests" to the court a lack of diversity,
the action must be dismissed as the federal court is without power to act.
23
The dicta in the instant case indicated that the appellate court may
make an inquiry into jurisdiction if the trial court has not made a deter-
mination of the jurisdictional facts.24 A trial court may make additional
inquiries into jurisdiction if the parties can introduce evidence which was
not available at the time of pleading.25 The decision appears equitable,
since the statute of limitations on the claim had expired.2 6 However, it does
not appear to conform with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 2 7 nor with
the current trend to reduce the work load of the federal courts. It is
submitted that the result of the instant case is to give the trial judge
discretion, under these facts, as to whether he will dismiss a diversity
action, when in fact no such discretion formerly existed.
JOHN B. WHITE
FEDERAL COURTS-THE "SILVER PLATTER" DOCTRINE
The petitioners were convicted in a federal district court for intercepting
and divulging telephone communications in violation of the Communi-
cations Act of 1934.1 The evidence which led to their conviction had been
obtained originally by state officers with a search warrant issued "upon
information and belief" that one of the petitioners possessed obscene
21. America Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951); Mitchell v. Maurer, 293
U.S. 237 (1934); Hospoder v. United States, 209 F.2d 427 (3d Cir. 1953); Orth v.
Transit Inv. Corp., 132 F.2d 938 (3d Cir. 1942); Page v. Wright, 116 F.2d 449 (7th
Cit. 1940); Bailey v. Texas Co., 47 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1931).
22. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated in an earlier decision: "It
is axiomatic that jurisdiction may not be conferred or waived by the parties and that
courts at every stage of the proceedings may and must examine into its existence."
Hospoder v. United States, 209 F.2d 427, 429 (3d Cit. 1953).
23. See note 7 supra.
24. Di Frischia v. New York Cent. R.R., 279 F.2d 141, 144 (3d Cir. 1960).
25. Price v. Greenway, 167 F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1948); Klee v. Pittsburgh & W. Va.
Ry., 22 F.R.D. 252 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
26. It is of interest to note that if the dismissal by the trial court had been affirmed,
the plaintiff could have brought the action in Ohio, where the cause of action accrued.
Ohio has a statutory savings provision which tolls the statute of limitations in that state
to permit a party to bring a new action within one year after his earlier action has been
dismissed other than on the merits. Onio REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.19 (Baldwin 1958).
27. See note 7 supra.
1. 48 Stat. 1100, 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §§ 501, 605 (1958); 62 Stat. 701
(1948), 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1958).
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pictures. The search had revealed instead paraphernalia believed to have
been used in making wire taps. During the state proceedings 2 federal
officers, acting under a federal search warrant, obtained the wire tap para-
phernalia from the state, and a federal indictment was returned on the
basis of this evidence. Before trial the petitioners moved to suppress the
evidence on the ground that the search and seizure by the state officers
had been invalid. The federal district judge denied the motion because
there was no evidence that any federal agent knew or suspected that the
search was contemplated or was made by the state officers until an account
appeared in the newspaper. The convictions were affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. Held, reversed: evidence obtained by state officers during a
search which, if conducted by federal officers, would have violated the
defendant's immunity from unreasonable search and seizure under the
fourth amendment is inadmissible over the defendant's timely objection
in a federal criminal trial. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) .
4
This decision overturned a practice which has existed in federal
criminal prosecutions since 1914. In Weeks v. United States,5 the Supreme
Court set forth two rules of evidence. The first, the federal exclusionary
rule, established the principle that evidence obtained by federal agents
in violation, of the defendant's fourth amendment rights will be rejected
in a federal criminal prosecution. The second, known later as the "silver
platter" doctrine,6 declared that an unlawful search, as set forth in the
fourth amendment, was not a search by a federal agent if the evidence
was secured by state authorities who delivered it to the federal officers.
In 1927 two Supreme Court decisions upheld, but somewhat limited,
the applicability of the "silver platter" doctrine. In Byars v. United States,7
a federal prohibition agent was asked to and did accompany a local police
officer in a search of defendant's room for intoxicating liquors. The search
revealed internal revenue stamps, counterfeited in violation of a federal
statute, under which the defendant was indicted. The Court held the
evidence inadmissible because the search was a joint endeavor by federal
and state authorities. In the second case," state officers arrested and
searched defendants without probable cause. They seized intoxicating
liquor, which was immediately turned over to federal authorities as evidence
for prosecution of defendants under the National Prohibition Act. The
2. Two Oregon state courts held the search unlawful and granted petitioners'
motion to suppress.
3. Elkins v. United States, 266 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1959).
4. 80 Sup. Ct. 1437 (1960). The Court vacated judgment on the same day
in Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960), for a redetermination by the district
court of the validity -of a search by municipal officers in order to decide the case by
the rule -established in Elkins v. United States.
5. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
6. This label was first used in the majority opinion in Lustig v. United States,
338 U.S. 74, 79 (1949).
7. 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
8. Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927).
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Court found that the state police officers were performing their supposed
duty solely for the purpose of aiding the federal government in its
prosecution; the evidence obtained by the unlawful search was therefore
inadmissible.
However difficult and unpredictable their application to concrete cases
may have been, the controlling principles were clear. Evidence obtained by
state officers entirely on their own account would not be excluded in a
federal criminal prosecution even though obtained by a search which,
if conducted by federal officers, would have violated the fourth amendment's
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures, because the fourth
amendment was not applicable to a search by state officers. 9 Then in 1949,
in Wolf v. Colorado,10 Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated:
The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the
police - which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment - is basic
to a free society. It is therefore implicit in the 'concept of ordered
liberty' and as such enforceable against the States through the
Due Process Clause."1
In another case,' 2 decided the same day as Wolf, the Supreme Court
carefully left open the question of the validity of the "silver platter"
doctrine. By finding federal participation in an illegal search b5 municipal
officers, the Court found it unnecessary to decide whether an illegal search
by state authorities would bar evidence obtained from such a search in
a federal trial.13 This question raised by the Lustig case remained un-
answered by the Supreme Court for eleven years.'
4
The prevailing opinion in the Elkins case uses the statement of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in Wolf v. Colorado"' as the foundation for over-
turning the "silver platter" doctrine. In supporting a rule which would
exclude relevant evidence from the trial of a federal criminal case, the
majority opinion justifies its position on three grounds. First, it is logically
impossible to justify a flouting of the constitutional guaranties against
unreasonable search and seizure under the fourteenth amendment and to
disallow the same thing under the fourth. There is no distinction between
evidence obtained in violation of either amendment. The purpose of the
exclusionary rule is to "compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in
9. For a complete account of decisions based on the "silver platter" doctrine,
see Annot., 50 A.L.R. 2d 531 (1956).
10. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
11. Id. at 27-8.
12. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
13. Id. at 79.
14. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 Sup. Ct. 1437, 1442 (1960).
For a complete rcsumn of state courts which have held evidence unlawfully obtained
by federal officers to be inadmissible in a state prosecution, see Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 531
(1956). See also Hanna v. United States, 260 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1958), for the
opinion of the first federal court to refute the "silver platter" doctrine.
15. Wolf v. Colorado, note 10 supra.
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the only effectively available way - by removing the incentive to
disregard it."16
The second consideration is the avoidance of needless conflict between
state and federal courts for the continuance of a "healthy federalism.117
In those states Which have adopted the exclusionary rule,18 use of the
"silver platter" doctrine by federal courts frustrates state policy. The state's
efforts to assure obedience to the federal constitution are defeated when
evidence that the state excludes as unreasonably obtained can be used by
the federal court sitting Within the state. Further, this doctrine will
remove any subterfuge between federal and state law enforcement officers,
for no longer will the former be able to remain aloof from an investigation
while impliedly encouraging the latter in the disregard of a constitutionally
protected freedom.19
Finally, there is a compelling need for judicial integrity. By allowing
unlawfully obtained evidence to be admitted into federal courts, the
latter become accomplices in disobeying a constitution they are sworn
to uphold.20
Cloaked in the robe of stare decisis,21 Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
speaking for the minority, assails the foundation 22 and the rationale of
the majority opinion. The following four considerations formed the basis
for his dissent. First, in Wolf v. Colorado,23 the Court decided that the
"core of the Fourth Amendment," 24 and not the amendment itself, was
enforceable against the states through the fourteenth amendment due
process clause. Some of the principles underlying the specific safeguards
of the first eight amendments are implied litations upon the states
within the due process clause of the fourteenth, but to this extent only
are individuals afforded federal protection against state authority. A
16. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 Sup. Ct. 1437, 1442 (1960).
17. Id. at 1446.
18. Alaska, California, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming and District of
Columbia; to some extent in Alabama and Maryland where covered by statute. Annot.,
50 A.L.R.2d 531 (1956); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 Sup. Ct. 1437,
1448 (1960) (Appendix).
19. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 Sup. Ct. 1437, 1446 (1960).
20. Id. at 1447.
21. Mr. Justice Frankfurter appears unduly to emphasize in his dissent the
long history of the "silver platter" doctrine, especially the fact that it was first
pronounced and subsequently followed by Courts upon which sat Justices Holmes and
Brandeis. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 Sup. Ct. 1437, 1453-4 (1960)
(dissenting opinion).
22. It must be recalled that, ironically, it was Mr. Justice Frankfurter's statement
in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-8 (1949), upon which the majority's foundation,
now attacked, is based.
23. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
24. Id. at 27.
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distinction must be made between the specifics of the first eight amendments
and the generalities of the due process clause.
2 5
It is therefore a complete misconception of the Wolf case to
assume, as the Court does as the basis for its innovating rule,
that every finding by this Court of a technical lack of a search
warrant, thereby making a search unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, constitutes an "arbitrary intrusion" of privacy so as to
make the same conduct on the part of state officials a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
26
Second, the only justification for an exclusionary rule is that it exerts
a controlling, and perhaps civilizing, pressure upon law-enforcement
officers. But if state courts may, on the grounds of the Wolf decision,
admit illegally obtained evidence, there is no reason to assume that police
in states which do not follow an exclusionary rule will be influenced by
the fact that this evidence may be excluded from a federal prosecution.
Even if this federal exclusion did have an inhibiting influence, however,
the federal courts cannot exercise supervisory control over state officials
as they can and do over federal officers. It follows, then, that the rule is
without justification.
7
Third, the abolition of the "silver platter" doctrine, purportedly to
avoid conflict between state and federal courts, will produce just the
opposite result. If a federal court must make an independent inquiry into
the reasonableness of a search and seizure by state officers, it is easily
foreseeable that a federal court may find a state officer to have been at
fault in his method of search after he has been exonerated by the state,
or conversely, the federal court may absolve what the state has condemned.
While the Court speaks %f the need for "judicial integrity," it would
refuse to accept the ruling of a state court that evidence had been illegally
obtained by state officers.28
Finally, the majority has shown no instance in which a federal court
has expressed great difficulty in determining whether a search was carried
on by state or federal officers. The "silver platter" doctrine has been a
workable rule, and to discard a rule which has the history, experience
and authority of this one should require more than the unsubstantiated
assumption that federal officers will engage in "subterfuge" to evade the
sanctioned command of the Supreme Court.29
At first glance, the decision in Elkins appears to be a "giant step"
toward incorporating the fourth amendment into the due process clause
of the fourteenth. Closer examination, however, reveals a result that is
25. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 Sup. Ct. 1437, 1456 (1960)
(dissenting opinion).
26. Ibid.
27. Id. at 1457.
28. Id. at 1461.
29. Id. at 1458.
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consequential indeed, but not nearly so far-reaching. Mr. Justice Stewart
seems to begin his opinion correctly by stating that "what is here invoked
is the Court's supervisory power over the administration of criminal justice
in the federal courts." 30 Then, apparently losing sight of this invocation,
he indulges in a constitutional argument unnecessary to the result reached.
He attempts to show that as a result of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's statement
in Wolf v. Colorado,31 the majority is justified in overthrowing the "silver
platter" doctrine. This rationale could be expected were the Court excluding
illegally-obtained evidence from a state prosecution. This the Court was
not called upon to do. Instead, it has extended its undisputed supervisory
power over the federal courts to exclude all unlawfully-obtained evidence
from federal prosecutions, no matter what the source. But while the Court
.has reached a logical and necessary result, it appears to have compromised
itself by rebutting the unjustified reasoning of the "silver platter" doctrine
first set forth in Weeks v. United States,a2 rather than merely reaffirming
its inherent power over the federal courts.
PHILIP N. SMITH
DUE PROCESS-RIGHT TO SELECT
COUNSEL
Petitioner was found guilty of burglary and sentenced to the state
prison. The trial judge allowed defense counsel to withdraw five days before
the trial, and refused to appoint counsel or grant petitioner's request for
a continuance so that he could obtain his own counsel. By habeas corpus
proceedings the petitioner challenged the legality of his conviction.
Held: conviction set aside since the denial of a reasonable opportunity to
employcounsel violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution and the Florida Constitution. Cash v.
Culver, 122 So.2d 179 (Fla. 1960). 1
30. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 Sup. Ct. 1437, 1443 (1960).
31. "The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police
is ... implicit in the 'concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
32. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
1. After Cash's conviction in 1955 he was sent to Raiford prison to serve a
15-year sentence. No appeal was taken. While in prison he drew up a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus which he sent to the Florida Supreme Court. This petition
alleged: (1) that he had requested the court to appoint counsel and this request was
refused, and (2) that the court refused to grant a continuance, after his attorney
had withdrawn five days before the trial began, so that he could obtain counsel. He
contended both of these actions of the trial judge violated dne process of law. The
Florida Supreme Court denied the petition without hearing or opinion.Thereafter, having obtained an attorney, he petitioned the United States Supreme
Court for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging the same facts he had brought before the
1961]
